Abstract-the demand on mobile data usage is exponentially increasing since the introduction of iPhones in 2007. The network became congested as millions of users tried to browse website and social networks, send e-mail, stream multimedia, and transfer file simultaneously. An immediate solution for the providers will be to change their pricing strategy with the goal of slowing down heavy users and decreasing the bandwidth demand. From the users' standpoint, network providers must constantly upgrade their infrastructure to accommodate new applications and devises. However, upgrading the infrastructure will be costly for the provider. A provider will prefer a minimum investment to upgrade the network while attracting the maximum number of customers. On the other hand, without regular upgrade of the network from the provider, there may be more congestion, more delays, and generally a low QoS at the user's dissatisfaction. Moreover, users that experience bad connection will be tempted to switch providers. We analyze the dynamic communication market and the users and providers' interactions in the framework of repeated game theory. We consider noise in user monitoring. We also compare two scenarios: individual and independent actions of users as opposed to the collective actions of users. For a collective action, a database aggregating users' QoS through a binary vote (good or bad QoS) needs to be implemented. The users keep their provider if and only if their majority reports a good QoS. This research shows that if the users collaborate, their bargaining power is increased.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, we have observed an increase of the number of smart phones, iPhones, PDAs, and other mobile devices. Moreover, the number of users is increasing in countries all over the world. Beside voice communication, those mobile devices support multimedia applications such as videos and TV that consume a tremendous amount of bandwidth. The number of new multimedia applications exponentially increases each year. Those multimedia applications become part of our everyday life. The users are more and more interested in new applications. However, the increase of the number of users and the number of applications coupled with the high bandwidth requirement of those applications tend to saturate the network. All network carriers are striving to keep their network capacity above the data demand. In fact, for the last four years, the demand in data network has been doubling each year. However, we do not observe a similar growth in network capacity. As a consequence, networks become more congested over the years as the demand in bandwidth from the users grows faster than network capacity. Network providers are slow to increase the network capacity because of the cost involved. Clearly, there is a conflict of interest between the network provider's profit and the user's satisfaction. We will model this conflict of interest in the framework of repeated game theory. Game theory is the branch of applied mathematics that models and analyzes strategic interaction among rational decision makers.
One cause of the high increase in bandwidth demand was the pricing mechanism practiced by the provider. Service provider used to practice a flat rate model instead of a usage-based one. As a consequence, for most operators, a very small percentage of users are responsible for the majority of traffic. For instance, in December 2009, the AT&T CEO confirmed that 3 percent of its Smartphone's users generate about 40 percent of its data traffic [1] . This is at the disadvantage of both the majority of users and providers. The low traffic users in a flat price model subsidize the high traffic users.
Several providers quickly realized the drawback of a flat rate pricing mechanism and adopted a tiered pricing model. As an example, AT&T adopted a tiered pricing model in June 2010. Verizon followed. Sprint and others will certainly follow soon. This is a strategic move on the providers' part. The benefits to a provider of tiered pricing model are three fold. First, the demand of bandwidth is reduced. In fact, higher price for higher tiers enforce low bandwidth usage. Second, the necessary investment to keep up with a good QoS is reduced and can even be eliminated. Last but not least, the providers can increase their profit.
There is rich literature on game theoretic modeling of userprovider interactions. Hassan et al [2] show that the user can use a brinkmanship technique to provide credible threats to the provider and therefore compel the provider to allocate more resources to users. Sengupta et al [3] investigate a market in which multiple service providers compete to get a large portion of the spectrum and sell it to a maximum number of users. Other works analyzing provider price competition to attract users include [4] [5] [6] . The work in [7] examines one provider's Nash equilibrium price under asymmetric information. A comprehensive survey of wireless service providers and user's interactions can be found in [8] . An application of game theory to packet forwarding is found in [9] [10] . This paper considers one provider and multiple users. User/provider interaction will be modeled as a repeated game. The threat available to a user is based solely on repeated interactions. The prospects of future loss of customers will oblige the providers to invest in the network. A customer will monitor the channel condition and QoS and leave a service provider that does not invest in the network to provide a good QoS. We will also consider the impact of noise on monitoring. It is possible that a service provider invests to improve the QoS while a customer still experience congestion and delay due to the non-reliability of the wireless channel.
We will consider two scenarios in our analysis. The first scenario deals with independent users that observe the provider's action (act) separately. The second case is about the users who observe and react collectively. We will show that collective monitoring is better in the sense that it increases the monitoring accuracy. Thus, a more efficient equilibrium is reached under collective monitoring. Moreover, acting collectively increases the bargaining power of users and can force the provider to make substantial investments and increase the supply of bandwidth. Certainly, the best solution to mobile data explosion should not be solely based on price increase, to decrease the demand on bandwidth, but also on adequate investment to increase the bandwidth supply. This research focuses on increasing the bandwidth supply.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II is about the stage game model between a user and a provider. Section III analyzes repeated interactions under perfect monitoring. Section IV considers noise in monitoring. Section V extends the one user model to n independent users. Section VI analyzes the collective action of the n users. Section VII presents the numerical results and Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. STAGE GAME MODEL
We consider a service provider with several users. The service provider owns the network infrastructure. The service provider is responsible for the network administration and maintenance. We assume that the demand in bandwidth from the users' devices and applications increases with time. Then, the users experience more congestion and delay if the provider does not increase the network capacity. Therefore, the service provider should periodically invest in the network infrastructure to accommodate the extra network traffic demand and maintain the same QoS. The new investment in network infrastructure can be in the form of new cell towers, change from cable to fiber optic to increase the capacity in the backbone of the network, or simply change in modulation techniques or software upgrades.
We assume that time is divided in periods. The length of a period is T. A period T can be a month to correspond with the billing cycle. At the end of each period, the service provider has two strategies or choices: Invest in the network (I) or cooperate or Not to Invest (NI) or defect. On the other hand, at the end of each period, a user can either Keep the Provider (KP) or cooperate if satisfied with the QoS or Change the Provider (CP) or defect if not satisfied. We consider that a user is free to change the provider at the end of each period if not satisfied. This means that there is no contract that prevents the user from switching the provider. We assume that there is no monopoly or there are several service providers that the users can choose from.
For the sake of simplicity, we start by presenting a two players' game between one user and a service provider. The n user's case will be the subject of Section V. In this Section, we assume perfect monitoring and will consider imperfect monitoring in Section IV. Therefore, we presuppose that a user experiences a good QoS if the provider has invested and experiences a bad QoS otherwise. The user and the provider decide simultaneously. The strategic form of the user/provider game is represented in Table I . Let us examine the payoff structure of the game. The payoff or utility function characterizes the players' satisfaction given a profile of action. For the user, we need to establish an ordinal relation between the payoff A, B, C and D. The user prefers the provider to invest than not to invest, thus . Also, if the provider chooses to invest (I), the user has a good QoS and prefers KP to CP. In other words, we have . However, if the provider chooses NI, the user will prefer CP to KP. This means that . Finally, we have for the user: .
Without loss of generality, we assign a quantitative value to the user payoffs. We consider that when a user changes the provider, he/she is indifferent to the past provider's behavior and did not incur any gain or loss from that provider's action. Then, we have . Let f be the periodic fee the user pays to the provider. Let v be the value to the user of the service received from the provider. The two possible values of v will be if the user receives a good QoS and if the QoS is bad. We assume that . Thus, we have:
and . When we normalize the payoffs to that of mutual cooperation (KP,I), we have . Here, l represents the loss due to bad service.
We now analyze the provider payoff. If the user cooperates or keeps the provider (KP), the provider prefers not to invest (NI) to invest (I). This is obvious since investing is costly. Then, we have . Similarly, if the user plays CP, the provider again prefers NI to I. Then, we have . As we can see, for one-shot games, the provider always prefers NI to I regardless of what the user does. Therefore, cooperation (I) is dominated by defection (NI). We assume that the market conditions are such that the service provider prefers to invest in the network and keeps its user than not to invest and loose them. Thus, we must have . Finally, we have for the provider:
.
As for the user, let us find the quantitative values of the provider's payoff. Let e be the average expense required to accommodate a user with a good QoS and f be the periodic fee the user pays to the provider. We assume that . Thus, we have . When we normalize the payoffs to that of mutual cooperation (KP, I), we have:
with . Table II shows the strategic form of the game with normalized payoff. We can see that Table II represents an asymmetric game. This stage game has a unique Nash equilibrium. Mutual defection (CP, NI) is the Nash equilibrium. At the Nash equilibrium, the provider will not invest and the user will change provider. At a Nash equilibrium profile, no player can increase its payoff by a unilateral deviation. Moreover, each player plays a best response to the behavior of other players. However, the Nash equilibrium in this game is not Pareto efficient. An allocation is Pareto efficient if there is no other allocation that can make at least one player better off without making any other player worse off. The Pareto efficient outcome is mutual cooperation (KP, I) where provider invests and the user stays. We show in the next Section that the provider and the user can reach the Pareto efficient outcome when the interactions are repeated.
III. REPEATED GAME MODEL There are two players: a user and a provider. The stage game in Table II is repeated over time. The provider discounts future payoff by a common discount factor į and we have . Player i ( ) sequence of stage game payoffs is . The provider is a long-lived player [11] and wants to maximize the expected į-discounted average of its sequence of payoffs. Therefore, the provider's repeated game payoff is given by:
The users are short-lived players and are concerned only with the payoff in the current period. This means that the user plays the myopic best reply to the provider's action. We consider the following strategy for the user: start by cooperating and continue to cooperate until you observe a defection, defect forever after a defection. This simple strategy is called Grim Trigger strategy. The strategy is grim because it does not forgive. Also, it needs a trigger (a defection) to defect forever.
The main concept used to analyze a repeated game under perfect monitoring is the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) [11] . A strategy profile is a SPE of the repeated game if it represents a Nash equilibrium after every history or subgame of the repeated game. SPE is a stronger criterion than the Nash equilibrium. SPE eliminates Nash equilibrium in which players' threats are not credible.
Theorem 1:
The strategy profile where both the user and the provider use grim trigger is SPE if and only if:
Proof: A strategy profile is SPE if and only if there is no profitable one-shot deviation [11] . One -shot deviation of the provider is not profitable if:
Moreover, when the provider cooperates, the best response of the user is to cooperate. Also, when the provider defects, the best response of the user is to defect ů
IV. IMPERFECT MONITORING GAME
Up to now, we did not consider noise when a player monitors the opponent behavior. In fact, it is not realistic to assume that a user can perfectly monitor the provider behavior. Even if the provider invests in the network infrastructure, a user can still experience a low QoS due to the non-reliability of the wireless channel. Random events such as weather conditions can impose performance degradation on the wireless network. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that a provider knows for sure when a user decides to stay or to leave. Therefore, the user's action will be public while the provider's action will be private. However, there is a public signal indicating the past action of the provider. Thus, we have a game of imperfect public monitoring.
Let
and be the user and provider's action respectively. Also, İ denotes the error in user's monitoring. The distribution of the public signal is given by:
We assume that This ensures that it is more likely that the user observes the high quality signal when the provider plays I and observes the low quality signal when the provider plays NI. As before, we consider that the user plays KP when observing the good signal and plays CP forever when observing the bad signal .
represents the repeated game payoff of the provider given the action profile . We have the following Bellman equation [12] , Equation (4) and (5) represent the repeated game payoff as a function of the initial payoff and future payoff. The future payoffs depend on the signal observed and take noise into account with the possibility of good and bad observations.
In any period, the provider prefers cooperation to defection if: Equation (6) shows that the provider is willing to cooperate if the payoff of mutual cooperation exceeds that of mutual defection by at least . This difference in payoff vanishes as noise decreases and the discount factor becomes close to 1. As a consequence, the provider will invest in the network at any given period under two conditions. First, the provider must be sufficiently patient. Future gain will have almost the same value as current payoff. Second, the provider must be convinced that the users are able to accurately monitor its behavior. For instance, the provider will find its investment in the network useless if that investment does not translate into a better QoS to a vast majority of users.
Let us evaluate the maximum value of . From (4), the maximum value of is achieved when is maximum. Then, taking (6) with equality, we have:
Replacing (7) into (4) gives us:
A necessary condition for the provider to cooperate is to have . This means that:
Equation (9) indicates that monitoring must be more precise when the temptation to defect or g increases.
V. EXTENTION TO N INDEPENDENT USERS
We consider a service provider with n users in a dynamic market. Each user independently monitors the channel condition to infer the provider's action. A user leaves the provider forever after experiencing a bad QoS or observing a low quality signal . A user stays with the provider otherwise. Let x denotes the total investment required from the provider to accommodate the n users and f the periodic fee paid by each user.
In a given period, when the provider chooses to invest in the network, the expected revenue of the provider in the next period will be:
k is the number of users observing a good signal.
Equation (10) takes into account the noise level and all combination of subsets of users that may experience good or bad signal. The k users that observe the good signal will stay with the provider and pay the fee f in the next period. On the other hand, n-k users will quit and not pay any fee. This translates into a binomial distribution and the corresponding expected value is represented in the right hand side of (10) .
Similarly, when the provider chooses not to invest in the network, its expected revenue in the next period will be: Therefore, the provider's cooperation can be enforced if:
If the total investment x is proportional to the number of users and e is the average investment per user. Then (13) becomes:
Consequently, when noise in monitoring vanishes and the revenue per user f exceeds the required investment per user e, there exists , such that the provider is better off cooperating when its discount factor is .
Note that the number of users can fluctuate from one period to the next due to the acquisition or loss of customers. Thus, we did not include the total sequence of payoffs. However, this analysis captures the essence of the game and players' interaction.
VI. COLLECTIVE ACTION OF THE N USERS
In the last Section, each user independently monitors the channel condition to infer the provider's action. Moreover, the users decide to stay or to quit the provider independently. In this section, we investigate what should happen if the users coordinate their actions.
We consider a tamperproof resistant database that helps to coordinate the users' action and observation. At the end of each period, each user sends its observation to the database. There are only two possible observations a user can report depending on the QoS: a good observation for a good QoS and a bad observation otherwise. The users agree to collectively leave the provider if the ratio of users experiencing a good QoS in a given period is below a pre-established cutoff score. Let us call that cutoff score Į, .
Similar reasoning as in the last section indicates that the provider cooperates when:
The difference here compared to the last section is that the provider will receive the full revenue nf or zero depending on if Įn users report a good signal or not. Assuming that the provider has a large number of users, which is generally the case, the Binomial distribution can be approximated by a Normal distribution. Then, (14) becomes: ĭ represents the cumulative distribution function of the Normal distribution.
Generally, a solution that enforces cooperation with the lowest discount factor is preferable. The discount factor measures the patience of the provider. Also, considering the interest rate per period r, the discount factor will be . Thus, a high interest rate per period implies a low discount factor. Therefore, in a competitive wireless communication market, we want even the least patient provider or those with a high interest rate per period to invest in the network for the collective benefit of its users. To achieve that, we need to maximize the denominator of (15).
A straightforward analysis shows that, for the difference is maximized when .
The message is that when Į is too big, the provider will find it risky to invest. In fact, few users may report a bad QoS due to noise and cause the provider to lose its entire customer base when the users act collectively. On the other hand, if the ratio Į is too small, the provider may not invest and expect few users to still report a good QoS. Recall that there is noise in users' observation. As a result, a fair value of one half is adequate.
When we take , we have:
Therefore, when we take the average investment per user, (15) becomes:
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we compare the provider's behavior when the users act independently to when the users act collectively. We consider a service provider with a large number of customers; say 10,000 users in a local area, a Zip code for instance. Users are divided in subsets. Subsets of users belong to the same area with similar channel conditions. We also assume that the provider uses 20% of its revenue in administrative and operational costs. Thus, Figure 1 compares the minimum discount factor that enforces cooperation in two scenarios: individual and independent decisions and collective decisions. In the case of independent user, the minimum discount factor required for the provider cooperation equals 1 when the noise level İ reaches 0.1. Therefore, it becomes impossible for the users to enforce the provider cooperation with a probability of observation error above 0.1. The result is a mutual defection which is not an efficient outcome. The incentive to cooperate is lost due to noise. However, when the users observe and decide collectively, the provider still has an incentive to cooperate with a noise level of 0.49. This is clearly in the advantage of both the provider and the users. Introducing a database that records all users' observations has, as a consequence, for advantage the increase of the monitoring accuracy.
Moreover, the database gives more bargaining power to users. The n+1 player's game becomes strategically equivalent to a two-player game. The provider is one of the players and the n users represent the second player. Figure 2 shows what will happen if the users are intransigent and request a cutoff score of 95%. The provider will cooperate under perfect monitoring or when the noise level is below 5%. Therefore, a fair cutoff score of 50% is better than the 95%. This is because the provider's investment becomes unprofitable under noise. Figure 3 analyzes the provider's action under noise and several other cutoff scores. We can see that the provider's behavior is symmetric on a cut off score of 0.5. Therefore, recommending that 75% of users report a good QoS is identical to a request of 25%.
A straightforward statistical analysis indicates that, for a 3 standard deviation confidence, we must have:
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This analysis shows that recording the provider's behavior in a database can have a valuable effect for users. The provider is forced to cooperate even with a high observation error (close to 0.5!). Collective observation increases the accuracy in monitoring and the bargaining power of users. Previous researches [3] [4] [5] [6] have emphasized the competition between service providers to guarantee market efficiency. This paper focuses on the power of repeated interactions and recording the provider's action.
Similar results can be obtained if the user does not use the grim trigger strategy presented here, but instead decides based on the provider's reputation. The provider's reputation will depend on the history of percentage of user's satisfaction. The mechanism described here is easy to implement. An application on a Smartphone can automatically monitor the QoS, report it at the end of each period to the database, read other users' observations, and recommend to switch the provider or not, depending on its past behavior or reputation.
We believe that this recording mechanism combined with the change of pricing strategy from flat rate to tiered pricing should avoid network congestion. The tiered pricing should decrease the demand in data traffic, whereas recording the provider's behavior should increase the network capacity.
All along this paper, we made the implicit assumption that the provider uses flat rate pricing. In the future, we will consider different pricing strategies.
Also, the behavior dynamic of other service providers has not yet been considered. Some users may leave a provider while new users join that provider. A complete market analysis can be done to investigate the optimum user and service provider behavior. It is well known that the market model proposes a simple and almost optimum solution to complex resource allocation problems for large scales.
